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THE COMMON LAW OF WAR
JENS DAVID OHLIN*
ABSTRACT
In recent litigation before U.S. federal courts, the government has
argued that military commissions have jurisdiction to prosecute
offenses against the “common law of war,” which the government
defines as a body of domestic offenses, such as inchoate conspiracy,
that violate the American law of war. This Article challenges that
definition by arguing that stray references to the term “common law
of war” in historical materials meant something completely different.
By examining the Lieber Code, the writings of early natural law
theorists, and early American judicial decisions, this Article con-
cludes that the “common law of war” referred to a branch of the law
of nations that applied during internal armed conflicts, such as civil
wars with non-state actors. This body of law was called “common,”
not because it was extended or elaborated by the common law method
of judge-applied law, but rather because it was “common” to all
mankind by virtue of natural law, and thus even applied to internal
actors, such as rebel forces, who were not otherwise bound by in-
ternational law as formal states were. By recapturing this lost
definition of the common law of war, this Article casts some doubt on
the U.S. government’s position that military commissions have
jurisdiction not only over international offenses, but also domestic
violations of the law of war.
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, jdo43@
cornell.edu. I received helpful suggestions and comments from Gabriella Blum, Steve Vladeck,
Marty Lederman, Kevin Clermont, John Dehn, Silja Vöneky, Elizabeth Anker, Sid Tarrow,
Chelsea Gunter, Benedict Kingsbury, and colloquia participants at Harvard and Cornell.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the “common law of war”? Good question. Few people
truly know, even among experienced scholars of international
humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict. This phrase sounds
like a legal term with a technical meaning, but, as it happens, law
of war experts with deep technical expertise have little familiarity
with the concept. If the term has a settled meaning, it is a hidden
one. So it came as a surprise when the United States government
invoked the “common law of war” in recent litigation before the
United States Court of Military Commission Review and the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Al Bahlul, an alleged member
of al-Qaeda who was prosecuted for the substantive crime of
conspiracy before a military commission.1 In the past, the U.S.
government had asserted that conspiracy was an international law
violation and therefore subject to prosecution before a military
tribunal.2 However, after both academic experts and federal judges
expressed grave skepticism that conspiracy was criminalized under
1. See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1167, 1183 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011),
vacated, No. 11-1324, 2013 WL 297726 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), reh’g en banc granted, No.
11-324 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
vacated in part, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
2. A four-judge plurality in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan I) concluded that conspiracy
was not a violation of international law. See 548 U.S. 557, 563 (2006). However, Justice
Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote in favor of Hamdan, did not sign on to that portion of
the opinion and resolved the case on other grounds. Id. at 636-54 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Consequently, the fate of conspiracy under international law was left to the lower courts to
resolve. Originally, the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review held that conspiracy was
triable at a military commission as a violation of international law. See Al Bahlul, 820 F.
Supp. 2d at 1224 (“[C]onspiracy as defined in the 2006 M.C.A. § 950v(b)(28) and the 2007
M.M.C. clearly casts a wide net of potential individual criminal liability; however, we are
mindful that two Congresses and two Presidents have agreed that conspiracy to commit
offenses enumerated in the 2006 and 2009 M.C.A. violate the law of armed conflict and are
punishable by military commission.”). The Court of Military Commission Review viewed the
conspiracy charge as supported by international law because it was essentially similar to the
criminal organization charges in the Nuremberg Charter. See id. at 1209; see also Jonathan
A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What
Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1160-62 (2009). However, that court’s
opinion was plagued by confusion between conspiracy as a substantive offense and conspiracy
as a mode of liability, demonstrated in the court’s analysis of Joint Criminal Enterprise
liability applied at the ad hoc tribunals, including at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia. See Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1210-13.
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international law, the U.S. government finally conceded that con-
spiracy was illegal under American law but not international law.3
One would think that this concession would doom conspiracy prose-
cutions before the military commissions, but not so. Instead, the
federal government broadened its theory of the commissions’
jurisdiction. Instead of limiting themselves to the international law
of war offenses, government attorneys alleged that military commis-
sions also had jurisdiction to try violations of the “common law of
war,” defined as “the practice of our own military authorities before
the adoption of the Constitution, and during the Mexican and Civil
Wars,”4 a position that had previously been advocated in 2006 by
Justice Thomas in his lengthy dissent in Hamdan.5
This change in position was greeted with shock.6 What is the
common law of war, and what precisely is common about it?7
Common as in common law from Britain? Or common law as in
judge-made precedent? Or neither? The U.S. government was
relying on the fact that the phrase “common law of war” was used
in passing in the Quirin decision in 1942,8 and that therefore there
3. In the Hamdan II litigation before the D.C. Circuit after the Supreme Court’s failure
to resolve the conspiracy question, see Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan II), 696 F.3d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 2012), government lawyers eventually conceded that conspiracy was not an
international law violation. See Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 38 (noting the government’s own
admissions over the course of the Hamdan II litigation that “the offenses of conspiracy,
solicitation, and providing material support to terrorism have not attained international
recognition at this time as offenses under customary international law” and that the
government “conceded that [all three offenses] are not violations of the international law of
war.” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Brief for the United
States at 57, Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d 1 (No. 11-1324), ECF No. 1374120, then quoting Transcript
of Oral Argument at 15, A1 Bahlul, 767 F.3d 1 (No. 11-1324), ECF No. 1460836)).
4. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (footnotes omitted).
5. See Hamdan I, 548 U.S. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The common law of war as
it pertains to offenses triable by military commission is derived from the ‘experience of our
wars’ and our wartime tribunals, and ‘the laws and usages of war as understood and practiced
by the civilized nations of the world.’” (internal citations omitted) (first quoting W. WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 839 (rev. 2d ed. 1920), then quoting Military Comm’ns, 11 Op.
Atty. Gen. 297, 310 (1865))).
6. See, e.g., GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR 218
(2d ed. 2015).
7. See Jens David Ohlin, What Is the Common Law of War?, OPINIO  JURIS (July 28, 2014,
1:45 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/07/28/common-law-war/ [https://perma.cc/G9PX-D4RU].
8. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 34 (“[T]he specified violations are intended to be only
illustrative of the applicable principles of the common law of war, and not an exclusive
enumeration of the punishable acts recognized as such by that law.”).
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was substantial precedent that military commissions have jurisdic-
tion over common law offenses.9 This theory was rejected by a three-
judge panel of the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan II, though the full D.C.
Circuit may be more tempted by it.10
This Article is a story about a single legal term and its history.
Despite what the government says, the phrase “common law of war”
simply does not stand for the idea that there is a body of American
law of war offenses that can be prosecuted before non-Article III
tribunals.11 In fact, “common law of war” means something far
different, though its meaning can only be understood by reference
to a bygone era—the era when international law was defined
primarily by natural law.12 And the term lends no support for the
government’s position that military commissions can prosecute
conspiracy as a violation of the common law of war. This is a story
of lost meaning, of concepts that fade away and are then rediscov-
ered, plucked from history and placed out of context, in an attempt
to sow confusion with ahistorical arguments.
The rest of this Article proceeds, out of necessity, in reverse
chronological order. The reason for proceeding in reverse chronologi-
cal order is to emphasize and appreciate the difficulty that modern
jurists face when dealing with a legal concept with an uncertain
9. See Brief for the United States at 21, Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d 1 (No. 11-1324), ECF No.
1374120 (“The Quirin decision relied on military commission jurisdiction over spying,
although spying is not a violation of international law, and in both Quirin and Hamdan I the
Court looked to domestic precedents, rather than only considering international law, to
determine whether an offense is lawfully triable by military commission.”).
10. See Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The Government contends that
those Civil War precedents illuminate what it calls the ‘U.S. common law of war’—not the
international law of war. But the statutory constraint here imposed by 10 U.S.C. § 821 is the
international law of war.”). The panel went on to note that the government’s own filings in
Quirin embellished the common law of war theory: “This ‘common law of war’ is a centuries-
old body of largely unwritten rules and principles of international law which governs the
behavior of both soldiers and civilians during time of war.” See id. (quoting Brief for the
United States at 29, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
11. For the best expression of the U.S. government’s view, see Brief for the United States,
supra note 9, at 40.
12. For further reflections on the role of natural law in the development of international
legal discourse, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2606-07 (1997) (“Thus, by the mid-seventeenth century, the theoretical foundations
that came to govern traditional international law had been laid: The discipline was now
deemed a branch of jurisprudence, born of both nature and of human will, driven by
sovereignty concerns, and segmented into public and private components.”); Jens David Ohlin,
The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 119, 121-40 (2015).
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pedigree. For any jurist, the most logical place to look for an answer
is recent history—that is, the usage of the phrase in recent legal
texts. That investigation might seem illuminating but the light
gives false comfort. In tracing the phrase further back in time, what
is revealed is not greater certainty in a settled meaning but rather
an origin story that bears almost no resemblance to how govern-
ment lawyers use the term today. A backward chronological method-
ology traces and ultimately reveals a lost meaning that deserves
consideration in today’s debates about not only the fate of Bahlul’s
prosecution, but indeed the jurisdiction of military commissions
generally and the very structure of the law of war itself. What is the
law of war? Is it a body of international law or is it partly a creature
of domestic law? It goes without saying that the history of the
concept of the “common law of war” should be of grave interest not
only to observers of Bahlul’s case, but indeed anyone who cares
about the legal regulation of war. At issue in this one phrase is not
just the jurisdiction of a single individual’s case but, more impor-
tantly, a generalized theory of the law of war as a sub-component of
general international law.
The story begins, in Part I, with the government’s invocation of
the common law of war in the Al Bahlul habeas litigation, and then
proceeds, in Part II, to examine the references to the common law
of war in the Quirin German saboteurs case during World War II.
In Part III, this Article then examines the use of the phrase during
the prosecution of the Lincoln assassins (when, as now, few people
understood the term). Part IV of this Article will trace the phrase to
its introduction by Francis Lieber in his codification of the laws of
war, and will explain where and why Lieber referred to the common
law of war as a regulating device for civil wars. Chief among the
reasons for Lieber’s invocation was that the U.S. Civil War was, in
fact, a civil war which had to be regulated by a body of law that
applied in noninternational armed conflicts. Finally, Part V will
explain the origin of the concept of the “common law of war” as
developed by early natural law theorists such as Emmerich de
Vattel.13 In short, the phrase “common law of war” had nothing to
13. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS  295, at 426-27
(Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers 1844) (explaining the
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do with a domestic body of law, but rather a proto-international set
of customary rules regarding warfare which applied during all
armed conflicts—whether they were classified as international or
internal wars.14 What was “common” about the law was that it
applied both to the state and to the rebel group that it was fighting.
In other words, it was a conceptual tool—a functional analog—for
explaining how the laws of war could apply not just to nation-states,
but also to non-state actors which otherwise could not be regulated
by the laws of war. Simply put, the common law of war was the
exact same thing as the international law of war except applied
during internal conflicts. Defined as such, the phrase does none of
the conceptual work that the U.S. government expects it to do in its
filings in the Al Bahlul litigation.
I. AL BAHLUL’S CONSPIRACY
Bahlul was captured in Pakistan by Pakistani forces in 2001.15 He
was subsequently transferred to the custody of U.S. armed forces
and sent to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and
eventually placed on trial before a military commission—one of the
few proceedings to run to a final verdict.16 After trial, Bahlul was
convicted of conspiracy, material support for terrorism, and solicita-
tion, all offenses that are best described as inchoate in nature.17 In
short, Bahlul was not charged with being responsible, as an accom-
plice, for the 9/11 attacks; indeed, it seems nearly beyond legal
dispute that the military commissions have jurisdiction over
individuals charged with direct responsibility in the 9/11 attacks as
sovereign’s reasons for observing “the common laws of war” when its “subjects take up arms”).
14. See id.
15. See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1156 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011).
16. Id. The procedural history is complex. Bahlul was first referred by the Deputy Ap-
pointing Authority for trial before the military commission in 2004. Id. However, his trial was
stayed pending the resolution of the Hamdan litigation regarding the fate of the military
commissions. Id. The Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan I that the commissions violated both
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. See
id. Congress responded by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006. See id. In 2008 the
Convening Authority again referred Bahlul back to the commission for prosecution. Id. The
trial was held in 2008 and resulted in a conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at
1156-57. For a full recitation of this procedural history, see id.
17. See Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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conspirators or accomplices. However, Bahlul’s case was built en-
tirely on inchoate offenses because the government was prosecuting
him for his contributions to the al-Qaeda cause and the organiza-
tion’s operations directed at the United States—terrorist attacks
that never came to fruition because Bahlul and others like him were
captured and taken to Guantanamo Bay.
On appeal, both before the U.S. Court of Military Commission Re-
view and the D.C. District Court, Bahlul argued that the inchoate
offenses were not punishable at military commissions because, inter
alia, the commission’s jurisdiction was circumscribed by the outer
boundaries of the international law of war, and the inchoate
offenses that formed the basis of his conviction were not part of the
international law of war.18 After consideration of these and other
arguments, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded in July 2014
that Bahlul’s convictions for material support for terrorism and
solicitation were unconstitutional because they violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Constitution.19 However, the panel upheld the
conspiracy charges.20
18. Brief for Petitioner at 17, Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d 1 (No. 11-1324), ECF No. 1362978 (“The
inchoate charges of conspiracy and solicitation to commit war crimes have been explicitly
rejected from the law of war. Going back at least to the Civil War, the United States has not
recognized inchoate war crimes.”). For more on the status of conspiracy under international
law, see JULIET R. AMENGE OKOTH, THE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 25-42 (2014).
19. Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 17-18.
20. Id. at 18-19. The panel concluded that the conspiracy conviction was not plain error
because the conduct already violated 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b): “It is not ‘plain’ that it violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause to try a pre-existing federal criminal offense in a military commission
and any difference between the elements of that offense and the conspiracy charge in the 2006
MCA does not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 18. Furthermore, the panel concluded that it was not plain error to
conclude that conspiracy was a law of war violation subject to prosecution before a military
commission. Id. The panel succinctly noted that the crux of the dispute was whether the
relevant “law of war” should be understood in international or domestic terms. Id. at 22-23.
Whatever the merits of the dispute, the court viewed both sides as reasonable interpreta-
tions, thus negating the possibility that the verdict constituted plain error:
The reason for the uncertainty is not only the divided result in Hamdan but also
the High Court’s failure to clearly resolve a subsidiary question: What body of
law is encompassed by section 821’s reference to the “law of war”? That dispute
takes center stage here. Bahlul contends that “law of war” means the
international law of war, full stop. The Government contends that we must look
not only to international precedent but also “the common law of war developed
in U.S. military tribunals.”
Id. (citations omitted).
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The D.C. Circuit returned to Bahlul’s case in June 2015 to once
again consider the fate of his conspiracy conviction.21 A divided
panel threw out that conviction as well,22 a result that is currently
being heard by the entire D.C. Circuit on reconsideration and
rehearing en banc.23 The U.S. government position has been, and
continues to be, that the jurisdiction of the military commissions is
not limited to international offenses.24 In addition to the more
familiar jurisdictional nexus for international offenses, the military
commissions are also constitutionally permitted, as an exception to
Article III of the Constitution, to prosecute violations of the
“common law of war”—the historical practice of U.S. military
commissions to prosecute various offenses against the law of war.25
According to the government, it makes no difference that these
offenses are not cognizable under international law and could not be
prosecuted in an international forum.26 In other words, it matters
little that other nations would not recognize offenses—such as
conspiracy—as violating the law of war.27 What matters is that
American military commissions of yore did recognize them as law
of war offenses and have historically punished violators for them,
including in the Quirin prosecution during World War II and in the
Lincoln conspirators trial during the U.S. Civil War.28 One conse-
quence of this governmental argument is to accept and concede a
certain degree of American exceptionalism in their jurisdictional
theory of military commissions. The Constitution permits military
21. Al Bahlul, 792 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
22. See id. Judge Rogers’s opinion explicitly rejected the domestic law of war offenses
argument: “The history on which the government relies fails to establish a settled practice of
trying non-international offenses in law of war military commissions.” Id. at 11. Judge Tatel
in his concurring opinion noted that there were only three votes on the Supreme Court in
Hamdan for the proposition that military commissions retain jurisdiction to try domestic of-
fenses under the “American common law of war.” Id. at 26 (Tatel, J., concurring). Conversely,
the majority of the Justices viewed the U.S. common law of war “as a source of constraint, not
expansion.” Id. at 9 (majority opinion) (citing Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2012)).
23. See Al Bahlul, No. 11-1324, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16967, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25,
2015) (per curiam).
24. See Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 20.
25. For more discussion of this theory, see Peter Margulies, Defining, Punishing, and
Membership in the Community of Nations: Material Support and Conspiracy Charges in
Military Commissions, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 90-91 (2013).
26. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 38-41.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 35.
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commissions to try offenses that Americans have historically viewed
as law of war offenses—even if the rest of the world does not
currently consider (and has never considered) them as punishable
under the law of nations.29
As Steve Vladeck explains in his leading article on the subject,
the jurisdiction of the military commissions is complex and under-
theorized.30 Article III of the Constitution invests the judicial func-
tion in Article III courts31 and the jury requirement embodied in the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments protects the right of all individuals to
have their cases heard before a jury.32 Furthermore, Article III
arguably protects the rights of all individuals to have their cases
heard before an Article III judge with life tenure.33 Over the years,
the Supreme Court has announced various exceptions to the
requirements of Article III and has allowed some cases to proceed
in alternate fora.34 However, the scope and justification for these
exceptions are ad hoc and lacking in a deeper normative
foundation.35 Although it is clear that military justice is, in some
cases, exempted from the requirements of Article III, it is unclear
why and what limitations, if any, apply to that exception.36 Accord-
ing to Al Bahlul, the military justice exception is limited to offenses
that violate the laws of war—an international body of law.37 In
contrast, the government insists that the military justice exception
also applies to domestic common law of war offenses.38
Although the Supreme Court has only had a few occasions to
define the scope of the military commissions’ jurisdiction, it did so
during the Quirin case.39 Unfortunately, its statements were am-
biguous and rested on false premises, which makes it extremely
29. See id. at 35-36.
30. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 937 (2015)
(“[T]he military exception has increasingly become untethered from any textual or analytical
moorings.”).
31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
32. See id. amends. V, VI.
33. See Vladeck, supra note 30, at 952.
34. See id. at 934.
35. See id. at 934-36.
36. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military
Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 295, 301-12 (2010).
37. See Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
38. See Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 35-36.
39. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the Supreme Court’s
underlying theory of military jurisdictions.40 A full analysis of this
evidence now follows.
II. QUIRIN & THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MISTAKES
In 1942, Nazi saboteurs landed in the United States, on Amagan-
sett Beach on Long Island, New York, after traveling via German
submarines from Europe.41 Each member of the group was born in
Germany, spent some time living in the United States, and then
returned to his home country before World War II.42 During the war,
each became members of the German armed services and fought for
the German cause.43 The submarines landed in the United States
and the saboteurs were dispatched under cover of darkness.44
Although each wore a military uniform upon arriving on shore—
when the risk of capture was greatest—they subsequently removed
their uniforms and proceeded covertly to cities across the continen-
tal United States with plans to engage in acts of sabotage against
American civilian installations, such as railroads and power
plants.45 Less than a month after the men’s arrival, though, two of
them, Dasch and Burger, had a change of heart and went to the
American authorities with information regarding their plot and the
other saboteurs.46 At first, the story was considered so fanciful that
federal agents did not believe them.47 However, once their story was
confirmed, the other saboteurs were arrested.48
President Franklin D. Roosevelt insisted that the would-be sabo-
teurs be prosecuted before a military commission rather than a
civilian court, and that they be sentenced to death.49 The petition-
40. See infra Part II.
41. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).
42. Id. at 20.
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Robert E. Cushman, Ex Parte Quirin et al.—The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28
CORNELL L.Q. 54, 54-55 (1942).
46. See Cass R. Sunstein & Jack L. Goldsmith, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:
What a Difference Sixty Years Makes 2, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 263 (2002).
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 264 (citing Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Attorney
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ers filed habeas petitions with the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard
their case on an expedited basis.50 In a rush to hand down the
decision before the saboteurs were executed—which might have
damaged the legitimacy of the Supreme Court by revealing it as an
ineffectual institution in matters of national security—the Supreme
Court issued a hastily rendered per curiam decision which noted
only that the appeal was denied.51 Several months later, the Court
issued a formal opinion explaining its reasoning regarding the con-
stitutionality of the military commissions.52 The relevant passage
reads:
It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of
such offenses has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of
international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enum-
erate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns.
An Act of Congress punishing “the crime of piracy, as defined by
the law of nations” is an appropriate exercise of its constitu-
tional authority, Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, “to define and punish” the
offense, since it has adopted by reference the sufficiently precise
definition of international law. Similarly, by the reference in the
15th Article of War to “offenders or offenses that ... by the law of
war may be triable by such military commissions,” Congress has
incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military
commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law
of war, and which may constitutionally be included within that
jurisdiction. Congress had the choice of crystallizing in perma-
nent form and in minute detail every offense against the law of
war, or of adopting the system of common law applied by mili-
Gen. Francis Biddle (June 30, 1942) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Library)). Dasch and Burger were spared the death penalty when President Roosevelt
commuted their sentences to life in prison in recognition of their decision to implicate their
fellow Nazi saboteurs. See id. at 269. The others were all executed. See id.
50. See id. at 5. Justice Scalia later referred to the decision as “not th[e] Court’s finest
hour.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1942) (presenting verbatim the transcript of
that per curiam decision).
52. See id. at 1. The Supreme Court also upheld the commissions’ authority to prosecute
offenses pursuant to the common law of war in Yamashita. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,
20 (1946). This residual power was codified in Article of War 15 and later at 10 U.S.C. § 821
(2012). For a discussion of this codification, see American Bar Association Task Force on
Terrorism and the Law, Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, ARMY LAW.,
Mar. 2002, at 8-11.
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tary tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed
applicable by the courts. It chose the latter course.
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful popula-
tions of belligerent nations and also between those who are
lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject
to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing mili-
tary forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture
and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform
passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking
to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy,
or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly
through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction
of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals.53
The Court’s analysis seems simple enough: Congress has allowed
military commissions to try offenses against the law of nations but
has not explicitly codified which offenses qualify under that defini-
tion.54 Then comes the Court’s oblique reference to the “system of
common law applied by military tribunals.”55 The question is what
this phrase means. Does it include noninternational offenses? 
One way to get a handle on the Court’s invocation of the phrase
“system of common law” is to ask what the Supreme Court did in
the Quirin case. In Quirin, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
military commissions to prosecute a spy who “without uniform
comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property.”56 This was, apparently, how the
Supreme Court viewed Haupt, Quirin, and their confederates—as
unlawful belligerents who surreptitiously and covertly crossed
military lines without complying with the functional requirements
53. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-31 (omission in original) (footnotes and citations omitted).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 30; see also id. at 34 (referring to “applicable principles of the common law of
war”).
56. Id. at 31.
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of belligerency (such as wearing a distinctive emblem or carrying
their arms openly).57 Now, the question is what lessons one should
draw from this holding for other military commissions cases, like
Bahlul’s, that have nothing to do with spying. 
Here is one possible interpretation: The Supreme Court upheld
the jurisdiction of the military commissions in a case involving spies
and saboteurs, who are unprivileged combatants.58 However, being
a spy or an unprivileged combatant is not a violation of interna-
tional law; it is, rather, a violation of domestic law.59 Therefore, by
extension, the Supreme Court’s holding in Quirin stands for the
proposition that the military commissions have constitutional auth-
ority to try domestic law of war offenses.60
Why is spying a domestic law offense? It certainly appears, at
first glance, like a violation of the international law of war, but it is
not. There is no convention or international treaty that directly
outlaws spying, although the literature and practice of modern war-
fare is replete with examples of spies and saboteurs being captured
behind enemy lines and sentenced for treachery.61 However, there
is a big difference between a recognized international offense and
the lack of an international immunity that precludes prosecution for
a domestic offense.62
The best and most convincing view is that spying involves unpriv-
ileged conduct because the spy or the saboteur is acting perfidious-
ly—not carrying arms openly, not wearing a uniform—and therefore
is not entitled to the combatant’s privilege.63 The combatant’s
privilege is an international immunity that prohibits states from
prosecuting legitimate enemy combatants for their perpetration of
57. See id. at 21, 36-38.
58. See id. at 31.
59. See Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 40.
60. See id. at 40-41.
61. See Major David A. Anderson, Spying in Violation of Article 106, UCMJ: The Offense
and the Constitutionality of Its Mandatory Death Penalty, 127 MIL. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1990) (ex-
plaining that spying is not a violation of international law under Article 24 of the Hague
Regulations).
62. For more discussion of the privilege of combatancy, see generally Jens David Ohlin,
The Combatant’s Privilege in Asymmetric and Covert Conflicts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 337 (2015).
63. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 51-52 (2d ed. 2010); Sean Watts, Present and Future Conceptions
of the Status of Government Forces in Non-International Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L L.  STUD.
145, 151-52 (2012) (considering combatant’s privilege as immunity versus affirmative license).
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regular acts of battlefield belligerency.64 Legitimate combatants are
entitled to POW status instead of criminal prosecution, in confor-
mance with the Geneva Conventions.65 In the absence of such
immunity, the spy or saboteur can be prosecuted and punished—but
in this case the substantive offense is a domestic crime, not an
international crime.66 On this view, Quirin stands for the proposi-
tion that military commissions have the authority to prosecute
domestic law of war offenses.
This interpretation would seem cut and dry. But there is a prob-
lem with it. The problem is that the Supreme Court in Quirin was
apparently operating under the impression that spying was a viola-
tion of international law.67 Indeed, the Court described the commis-
sion’s law of war jurisdiction in purely international terms—a total
misnomer if it had believed that spying and sabotage were domestic
offenses. For example, the Court noted: “From the very beginning of
its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as
including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the
conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as
well as of enemy individuals.”68 This language makes clear that the
Court viewed the relevant offenses it was discussing as violations of
the law of nations.
The Court’s assessment was made even clearer in its next
sentence:
Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our
Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within
64. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Law and Morality at War, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 79, 88 (2012).
65. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
66. See RICHARD BAXTER, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, in HUMANIZING THE LAWS OF WAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF RICHARD BAXTER 37, 44
(Detlev F. Vagts et al. eds., 2013).
67. See Jonathan Hafetz, Policing the Line: International Law, Article III, and the
Constitutional Limits of Military Jurisdiction, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 681, 729 (“Additionally, while
spying may not violate international law, judicial acknowledgment of military jurisdiction
over spying in Quirin was premised on the assumption that spying does in fact constitute such
a violation. Thus, even though the Supreme Court may have misconstrued the content of
international law in addressing spying, it validated a mode of interpretation that looks to
international law to define the constitutional boundaries of military commission jurisdiction.”
(footnotes omitted)).
68. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) (emphasis added).
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constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commis-
sions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules
and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law
of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.69
Again, this statement makes it abundantly clear that the Quirin
Court viewed the law of war in exclusively international terms, and,
by logical extension, viewed the crimes in Quirin as violations
against the law of nations.
Other commentators have largely agreed with this interpretation
of the Quirin Court’s analysis, though it is unclear what conclusions
should be drawn from it.70 Here is the essential dilemma: One can
interpret the Supreme Court’s holding based on what it did, or one
can interpret the Court’s holding based on what it said it did—and
what it said it did involved a cognitive error. In reality, the Supreme
Court upheld the commission’s jurisdiction for a domestic crime.71
But the Supreme Court said (erroneously, it turned out) that it was
upholding the commission’s jurisdiction over an international of-
fense. How do you interpret a court’s holding when that holding is
based on a mistake? Do you interpret it subjectively or objectively?
The confusion here was not lost on some commentators even
immediately following the Quirin decision. Writing in 1951, the
leading American expert on the laws of war, Richard Baxter,
concluded that “espionage is not in violation of the law of nations”
and that the Supreme Court was deeply confused about this point
in Quirin:
[T]he tribunal was led by the somewhat imprecise distinction
often made between “lawful” and “unlawful” combatants to
conclude that failure to qualify as a lawful combatant could be
described as a violation of international law. If, indeed, the
Court was proceeding on the assumption that the law of nations
forbids the employment of spies and espionage itself, that view,
it is submitted, fails to find support in contemporary doctrine
regarding such activities in wartime.72
69. Id. at 28.
70. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 45, at 58-60.
71. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28.
72. BAXTER, supra note 66, at 44.
2016] THE COMMON LAW OF WAR 509
Baxter even went so far as to conclude, “[T]he characterization of
such conduct as a violation of international law arises, it is submit-
ted, from a fundamental confusion between acts punishable under
international law and acts with respect to which international law
affords no protection.”73 In other words, the Quirin defendants were
not entitled to the combatant’s privilege and were therefore subject
to prosecution for violating domestic offenses.74
Unfortunately, Baxter never stated directly his views regarding
whether this undermined Quirin’s central holding. Instead, he
simply noted (almost in passing) that “there is no doubt that secret
agents of this nature are subject to trial under the statutes or
military common law of the captor.”75 Still, the question remains as
to where such spies and saboteurs are subject to prosecution—an Ar-
ticle III court or a military commission? International law on that
question, as Baxter rightly notes, is completely silent.76 Instead,
that question is governed by domestic constitutional law and the
constitutional limits embodied in the military justice exception to
Article III requirements (whatever they are).
The result of this analysis is a fundamental ambiguity regarding
whether the Quirin decision supports the government’s position in
Al Bahlul that military commissions retain authority to prosecute
domestic offenses. Since the Supreme Court assumed in its decision
that Quirin and his codefendants had committed an international
offense, the Quirin holding is at best a conceptual tangle of faulty
assumptions, and at worst evidence of the opposite conclusion: that
military commissions are limited to prosecuting offenses that violate
the law of nations, not domestic offenses.
III. THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION
The government’s position regarding the jurisdiction of military
commissions to try domestic law of war offenses—so-called viola-
tions of the “common law of war”—does not rely exclusively on
Quirin. The Lincoln assassination saga arguably provides support
for its argument, in part because the resulting prosecutions were
73. See id. at 52-53.
74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75. BAXTER, supra note 66, at 52.
76. See id. at 38-42.
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based on conspiracy charges and also because the defendants were
brought before the military commission under the “common law of
war.”77 But on closer inspection, that support is deeply problematic
for two reasons.
First, the prosecution of the Lincoln conspirators, though nomin-
ally based on conspiracy, was not based on conspiracy as an inchoate
offense.78 The whole point of the Lincoln assassination is that the
conspirators completed the target crime—the crime to which the
conspiracy was directed. Moreover, the official charges included the
fact of Lincoln’s death in the description of the crime.79 Therefore,
the Lincoln case did not deal with the distinctively common law cat-
egory of conspiracy as an inchoate offense. Rather, it dealt with con-
spiracy as a pathway for convicting a defendant for participating in
a criminal plan that brought about a completed crime. Although it
is unclear whether the defendants were charged with conspiracy as
a substantive offense or conspiracy as a mode of liability for a mur-
der and treason prosecution,80 the undeniable fact is that the case
was not inchoate in nature. It therefore cannot stand as an example
of a trial of inchoate conspiracy before a military commission.
Second, and more importantly, the stray references to the “com-
mon law of war” in the Lincoln conspirators’ case were just as
nonsensical and confusing then as they are today. Although the
Judge Advocate General asserted that the charges were made pur-
suant to the “common law of war,” the transcripts reveal that even
then the phrase was utterly confounding to the trial participants.
For example, consider General Ewing’s speech made to the military
commission on behalf of defendant Samuel A. Mudd:
77. See Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 35 n.5.
78. See Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
79. Charge and Specification Against David E. Herold, George A. Atzerodt, Lewis Payne,
Michael O’Laughlin, Edward Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Mary E. Surratt, and Samuel A.
Mudd, in THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS
18, 19 (Benn Pitman ed., New York, Moore, Wilstach & Baldwin 1865).
80. See id.
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May it please the Court: If it be determined to take jurisdiction
here, it then becomes a question vitally important to some of
these parties—a question of life and death—whether you will
punish only offenses created and declared by law, or whether
you will make and declare the past acts of the accused to be
crimes, which acts the law never heretofore declared criminal:
attach to them the penalty of death, or such penalty as may
seem meet to you; adapt the evidence to the crime and the crime
to the evidence, and thus convict and punish. This, I greatly fear
may be the purpose, especially since the Judge Advocate said, in
reply to my inquiries, that he would expect to convict “under the
common law of war.” This is a term unknown to our language ...
wholly undefined and incapable of definition. It is, in short, just
what the Judge Advocate chooses to make of it. It may create a
fictitious crime, and attach to it arbitrary and extreme punish-
ment, and who shall gainstay it? The laws of war—namely, our
Articles of War—and the habitual practice and mode of proceed-
ing under them, are familiar to us all; but I know nothing, and
never heard or read of a common law of war, as a code or system
under which military courts or commissions in this country can
take and exercise jurisdiction not given them by express legal
enactment or constitutional grant.81
It is amazing to read these anxieties, expressed so long ago, re-
garding a concept that is still today deployed by the government to
justify prosecution before a military commission. Indeed, Ewing
specifically complained about his inability to defend, consistent with
due process, his client against a charge falling under the “common
law of war” when the term was impossible to understand.82
At first glance, it is hard to explain why the military commission
prosecuting the Lincoln assassination conspirators would have
relied on the common law of war in establishing the commission’s
81. Thomas Ewing, Jr., Argument of the Law and Evidence in the Case of Dr. Sam’l A.
Mudd, in THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS,
supra note 79, at 318.
82. Id. at 319. (“But of the common law of war, as distinct from the usages of military
courts, in carrying out and executing the Articles of War, I know nothing, and, on examining
the books, I find nothing. All that is written down in books of law or authority I am, or ought
to be, prepared to meet; but it were idle and vain to search for and combat a mere phantom
of the imagination, without form and void.”).
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jurisdiction. Where did the concept come from? Ewing’s speech
makes clear that the phrase was not in common usage at the time.83
The answer lies in the phrase’s centrality in the Lieber Code,
drafted on behalf of the Lincoln Administration by Francis Lieber,
an expert on the laws of war, a law school lecturer, and an admirer
of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the natural law theorists.84
Lincoln asked Lieber to draft the Code, which was then designated
as General Order Number 100 and given to Union officers.85 As
such, the Lieber Code quickly became a foundational document
regarding the legal regulation of armed conflict. Moreover, as John
Witt explains in his book Lincoln’s Code, the Code’s application
involved far more than the regulation of warfare conduct.86 It also
spoke to pertinent issues regarding presidential power during
armed conflict—a central concern for President Lincoln, who assert-
ed numerous unprecedented powers which he viewed as essential
for the conduct of the war.87 Not least among these was the power
to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and free the slaves.88
According to Witt, Lincoln’s authority to issue the Proclamation was
justified, in part, by the claim that the action was essential for the
Union’s war effort.89 The Lieber Code was a key piece of the legal
and political architecture of Lincoln’s presidential powers argument
because the Lieber Code, particularly in Articles 14, 15, and 16, laid
out a broad vision of the concept of “military necessity”—actions
necessary for the war effort.90 Lincoln justified the Proclamation,
among other presidential actions, as military necessity, and the
83. See id.; see also WILLIAM E. DOSTER, LINCOLN AND EPISODES OF THE CIVIL WAR 261
(1915) (noting that “[t]he crimes were not defined by any known rules of law but were vaguely
called offenses against the ‘common law of war’”).
84. For a richly drawn portrait of Lieber, see generally JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S
CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012).
85. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD art. 57 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1898) [hereinafter
Lieber Code], http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Instructions-gov-armies.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DZ32-WAVH].
86. See WITT, supra note 84, at 345.
87. See id. at 238.
88. See id. at 239.
89. See id.
90. See Lieber Code, supra note 85, arts. 14-16. For a longer discussion of military
necessity, see Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1297-1302
(2013).
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Lieber Code provided one articulation of the centrality of military
necessity as a pillar of the laws of war.91 As such, the Lieber Code
was of central importance to the legal theory of the Lincoln adminis-
tration. And as the following Part demonstrates, the “common law
of war” concept appears repeatedly in the Lieber Code, so it is no
surprise that the phrase was in the air and being invoked during
the Lincoln conspirators’ trial just a few years after the Lieber Code
was first adopted.
IV. THE LIEBER CODE
The Lieber Code makes multiple references to the “common law
of war.” First, Article 13 defines the outer limits of military juris-
diction.92 Lieber notes that military jurisdiction can come from
either statute or the common law of war.93 He states that “[m]ilitary
offenses under the statute law must be tried in the manner therein
directed; but military offenses which do not come within the statute
must be tried and punished under the common law of war.”94 The
question is what the “common law of war” means in this context.
The phrase reappears later in the Code. Article 19 suggests that,
whenever possible, commanders should inform the enemy of their
intent to attack and give noncombatants a chance to escape before
the attack begins, though the next statement says that surprise is
sometimes a military necessity and “it is no infraction of the
common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy.”95 Similarly,
Article 101 states that “deception in war ... is consistent with
honorable warfare” and that the common law of war permits
“capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts to
injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, and it is difficult
to guard against them.”96 Finally, Article 103 clarifies that “spies,
war-traitors, and war-rebels are not exchanged according to the
91. See WITT, supra note 84, at 234, 338 (“In Lieber’s hands, military necessity was both
a broad limit on war’s violence and a robust license to destroy.”).
92. See Lieber Code, supra note 85, art. 13.
93. See id.
94. See id. arts. 13-15.
95. Id. art. 19.
96. Id. art. 101.
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common law of war.”97 Article 103 clarifies that such an exchange
requires a government-authorized “special cartel.”98 
Why does Lieber make repeated references to the “common law
of war,” and what did he mean by it? The answers can be found in
the Lieber Code’s dual purposes. First, it was designed to apply in
a civil war between the Union and Confederacy.99 Second, it was
designed to be a general expression of the laws and usages of war.100
These two components stand in some tension with each other.
Generally, the law of war is viewed as coming from international
law—from the body of law that regulates interactions among sov-
ereign states. In that sense, the laws of war are a component of the
law of nations. But since a civil war is an internal conflict between
a government and rebels, how do the laws of war apply to it? After
all, there is nothing terribly international about a civil war.
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the U.S. Civil War was not
just any civil war—instead, it was the functional equivalent of an
international conflict.101 Lincoln pursued the war with the South
using a mixed theory of war.102 In one breath, Lincoln acted as if the
war was a civil war—a rebellion that the federal government had
every authority to put down.103 At the same time, Lincoln treated
the Confederacy as a recognized belligerent, a point that the
Supreme Court made in the Prize Cases when it affirmed applica-
tion of international rules of capture regarding southern ships.104
Indeed, the mixed theory of the war throws into sharp relief the
degree to which the international laws of war are both a license and
a constraint at the same time.105 In one sense, the international
97. Id. art. 103.
98. Id.
99. See WITT, supra note 84, at 345.
100. See id.
101. See STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR
18-19 (2010) (indicating British and French recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent
power); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 204 & n.2 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th
ed. 1952) (arguing that civil war between states in a federal system is international war even
in the absence of recognized belligerency from third-party states).
102. NEFF, supra note 101, at 22 (referring to a “dualistic approach”).
103. Id. at 15; see WITT, supra note 84, at 151 (“[P]reservation of the Union could be a war
and a criminal law enforcement action at the same time.”).
104. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863) (determining that Lincoln’s pro-
claimed blockade of southern ports was “conclusive evidence” that a state of war existed).
105. See WITT, supra note 84, at 234.
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laws of war constrain state behavior and prevent governments from
engaging in acts during public wars that they are free to commit
during civil wars, which are regulated by international law to a
lesser degree. But on the other hand, a state of war (in the interna-
tional sense) confers upon the government license to engage in acts
that were considered essential for Lincoln, including imposing
martial law and signing the Emancipation Proclamation.106
Nonetheless, the Lieber Code makes clear that the laws of war
apply to both international and civil conflicts.107 But what is the
conceptual and legal foundation for applying the laws of war during
a noninternational conflict? By definition the foundation cannot be
international law because these conflicts are not international.
Instead, the answer can be found in natural law. Lieber states in
Article 40 of his Code that “[t]here exists no law or body of authori-
tative rules of action between hostile armies, except that branch of
the law of nature and nations which is called the law and usages of
war on land.”108 So it is clear that, for Lieber at least, the laws of
war come from natural law and as such apply in civil wars as well.
Also, Lieber’s definition of war—which he believed could be regu-
lated by law—was broad enough to include all types of armed
conflicts, including internal conflicts: War is a “protracted physical
contest between large numbers.”109
Again, the question is how the laws of war can apply in a non-
international armed conflict. As indicated above, Lieber was
enamored with natural law theory and he drew from it a central
106. But see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866) (holding martial law
unconstitutional); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 145 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). For more
discussion of these and other cases, see Steven J. Bucklin, To Preserve These Rights: The
Constitution and National Emergencies, 47 S.D. L. REV. 85, 87 (2002) (“Hard pressed to
maintain the Union, Lincoln found it necessary to suspend some of the fundamental rights
of American citizens in order to prosecute the war.”).
107. See Lieber Code, supra note 85, arts. 149-57 (discussing insurrection and civil war).
Indeed, Lieber concludes in Article 154 that “[t]reating, in the field, the rebellious enemy
according to the law and usages of war has never prevented the legitimate government from
trying the leaders of the rebellion or chief rebels for high treason, and from treating them
accordingly, unless they are included in a general amnesty.” Id. art. 154. This suggests, by
omission, that Lieber viewed regular soldiers fighting on the battlefield as privileged
belligerents and, although subject to prosecution for treason, not subject to prosecution for
murder for regular acts of battlefield killing.
108. Id. art. 40.
109. See Francis Lieber, Law and Usages of War, Lecture at Columbia Law School (1861)
(on file with the Johns Hopkins University Milton S. Eisenhower Library).
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insight: natural law applied to and governed the relationship
between formal belligerents in a noninternational conflict.110 This
simple insight explains his use of the phrase “the common law of
war” in the Code. The common law of war was the law of war that
was “common” to all sides of an armed conflict. It was common
because its authority stemmed not just from the international
system, but more basically from natural law, a source of authority
that was not limited to sovereign states as its subjects.
Consequently, the best explanation of the phrase the “common
law of war” is that it represented a functional surrogate to the
international laws of war that applied in noninternational conflicts.
The “common” of “common law of war” was that it was common to
all sides of a conflict, even though one party was not a sovereign
state within the international system. The customary restrictions
of honorable warfare constrained sovereign states in public wars by
virtue of the law of nations; those same customary restrictions of
honorable warfare constrained both parties of a civil war by virtue
of the common law of war, which applied equally to governments
and rebel forces who organized themselves as belligerent forces. The
common law of war was derived not just from the practice of states,
but also—and more fundamentally—from the requirements of
natural reason.
Jurists’ usage during the earliest years of the American republic
confirms this reading of the phrase the “common law of war.” The
1790 case of Dulany v. Wells illustrates this understanding of the
term.111 The case involved a seemingly pedestrian dispute: namely,
a demand for payment of a debt stemming from a bond instru-
ment.112 The General Court of Maryland considered whether the
War of Independence had extinguished the obligation to repay a
private debt to a British subject.113 The court concluded that the
obligation endured despite the war between the United States and
Britain.114 In making this determination, the court extensively ref-
erenced natural law, which endured between the United States and
110. See id.
111. 3 H. & McH. 20, 20-24 (Md. Gen. 1790), rev’d, (June 1795).
112. See id. at 20.
113. See id. at 21-22.
114. See id. at 80. 
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Britain even when the two entities went to war.115 In answering the
objection that the war was “different from the usual case of war
between two different nations,” the court concluded that the com-
mon law of war, and hence natural law, applied to belligerents in a
civil war:
That a civil war breaks the bonds of society and government, or
at least suspends their force and effect, produces in the nation
two independent parties, considering each other as enemies, and
acknowledging no common judge. That these two parties are in
the case of two nations at war. That the common laws of war are
to be observed on both sides. That while subjects who take arms
against their sovereign acknowledge his authority, the effects of
war as to the acquisition of property do not take place; but when
they cease to acknowledge the authority of the sovereign, and
the nation is divided into two parts, absolutely independent, and
acknowledging no common superior, the state is dissolved, and
the war betwixt the two parties in every respect is the same with
that of a public war between two different nations.116
Dulany clearly demonstrates that the common law of war is a
surrogate to the law of nations, except that it applies in non-
international conflicts.117 Ultimately, both bodies of law stem from
the same source: natural law. In cases of international law, judges
refer to the laws of war that stem from the laws of nations and
natural law; in cases of civil war, judges refer to the laws of war
embodied in the common law of war, which also has its genesis in
natural law. Both regulate the behavior and interrelation of the
parties to an armed conflict. Consequently, the most accurate de-
scription of the common law of war is the international law of war
applicable in noninternational conflicts. That is precisely how the
phrase was used in the century before Lieber first put the phrase in
his Code. 
I should add that although an understanding of this phraseology
was subsequently lost to lawyers, the phrase is better understood by
115. See, e.g., id. at 25.
116. Id. at 74.
117. Dulany is not cited for the value of its holding on the matter of the debt obligation,
which was reversed on appeal. The case is cited for evidence of the historical usage, and
meaning, of the phrase “common law of war.”
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historians who write about that period. For example, Howard Jones
in his book Union in Peril correctly notes that the “common law of
war” applied to civil wars, a position that goes all the way back to
the natural law theorist Emmerich de Vattel.118 The fact that the
common law of war applied to the Union’s war against the Confeder-
acy was of no small consequence to either law or international
relations. Because the U.S. Civil War was governed by the common
law of war, the international rules regarding neutrality applied as
well. In accordance with those rules, third parties were entitled to
declare their neutrality to the conflict—which meant that as long as
they refused to grant assistance to either side of the conflict, they
could not be considered a belligerent or party to the war.119 As such,
they could not be attacked. In international wars, this rule stemmed
from the law of nations; in civil wars that were large enough to
implicate the rules regarding neutrality, the rule stemmed from the
common law of war. 
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized the legitimacy of the
common law of war in the Prize Cases, when the Court asserted that
the international rules regarding capture of vessels applied because
Lincoln had blockaded the southern ports, an action that indicated
that the administration viewed the Confederacy as a belligerent in
an armed conflict.120 Although the Supreme Court recognized that
the international rules regarding capture applied during the Civil
War, the Court did not view the conflict with the Confederacy as an
international conflict.121 Rather, the Court viewed the conflict as a
civil war.122 But even civil wars are governed by natural law through
the common law of war, as the Court noted when it quoted Vattel:
“This being the case, it is very evident that the common laws of
war—those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honour—ought
118. See HOWARD JONES, UNION IN PERIL: THE CRISIS OVER BRITISH INTERVENTION IN THE
CIVIL War 235 n.22 (1992).
119. See NEFF, supra note 101, at 167-68.
120. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 673 (1863) (“[A] civil war such as that now
waged between the Northern and Southern States is properly conducted according to the
humane regulations of public law as regards capture on the ocean.”).
121. Id. at 674 (noting that residents of the southern states were “liable to be treated as
enemies, though not foreigners”).
122. Id. at 667 (noting that the existence of the civil war was “a fact in our domestic history
which the Court is bound to notice and to know”).
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to be observed by both parties in every civil war.”123 In the absence
of the common law of war as a quasi-international body of law
regulating the conduct of noninternational conflicts, the Prize Cases
make no sense at all.
V. THE NATURAL LAW ERA
It now becomes essential to provide a larger explanation of the
role played by the phrase “common law of war” for natural law
theorists. The previous Parts of this Article have tried to draw a
direct line back in time from Al Bahlul, to Quirin, to the Lincoln
conspirators’ case, and then the Lieber Code. Ultimately, the
common law of war is a creature of natural law and must be
understood in that context. Indeed, part of the problem with
commentators’ inability to correctly decipher the phrase is their ig-
norance of natural law, which has faded as a jurisprudential ground
for the law.124 Whether one believes in natural law as a foundation
for modern lawmaking, it is essential to at least understand natural
law so as to correctly interpret phrases that first acquired their
meaning and structure during the natural law era. I submit that the
“common law of war” is one such phrase. It cannot be understood
independent from its natural law genesis.
The idea of a “common law of war” played a huge role in Vattel’s
philosophy, as in his Law of Nations, in which he laid out a set of
principles which applied to the conduct of nations.125 However, the
same principles also applied in wars between non-state entities.
This structure is rather confusing to modern international lawyers,
who work with a cardinal separation between international armed
conflicts (IACs) and noninternational armed conflicts (NIACs).126 In
the modern scheme, the prohibitions embodied in the UN Charter
123. Id. (quoting VATTEL, supra note 13, § 294, at 425).
124. See generally Koh, supra note 12, at 2608-13 (tracing the development of international
law from natural law roots to modern justifications).
125. See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 13, § 184, at 90.
126. See, e.g., L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 317 (2d ed. 2000);
Marko Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 256, 256 (Nigel D. White &
Christian Henderson eds., 2013). But see Tom Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts:
Toward the Definition of “International Armed Conflict,” 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 43 (1971).
520 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:493
and rules regarding jus ad bellum only apply during IACs.127
However, the use of force in NIACs is not similarly construed—there
currently is no jus ad bellum internum in the positive law.128 As for
jus in bello, the codified rules are sharply divergent. In IACs, the
behavior of states is constrained by all four Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I.129 For NIACs, the behavior of governments
fighting rebels is constrained by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions130 and the rather anemic Additional Protocol II.131 That
said, the trend in recent decisions at the ad hoc criminal tribunals
has been to recognize that some of the cardinal jus in bello princi-
ples apply equally in NIACs as they do in IACs by virtue of custom-
ary international law.132
Vattel and the other natural law theorists did not operate with
the same radical separation of IACs and NIACs. Rather, Vattel
viewed NIACs as potentially subject to the same legal regulation
when the civil war became the functional equivalent of a public war
between sovereign states:
A civil war breaks the bands of society and government, or at
least suspends their force and effect: it produces in the nation
two independent parties, who consider each other as enemies,
and acknowledge no common judge. Those two parties, therefore,
must necessarily, be considered as thenceforward constituting,
at least for a time, two separate bodies, two distinct societies.
Though one of the parties may have been to blame in breaking
the unity of the state and resisting the lawful authority, they are
not the less divided in fact. Besides, who shall judge them?
[W]ho shall pronounce on which side the right or the wrong lies?
On earth they have no common superior. They stand therefore
127. GREEN, supra note 126, at 44; see U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3 (mandating methods for
settling international disputes only).
128. See LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS 7 (2006).
129. GREEN, supra note 126, at 54-55.
130. Id. at 44.
131. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see also GREEN, supra note 126, at 61.
132. For a discussion on this point, see Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks on Non-Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 399, 406 (2012); Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic,
supra note 126, at 272 (noting the persistence of the classification scheme despite the
convergence trend).
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in precisely the same predicament as two nations, who engage
in a contest, and, being unable to come to an agreement, have
recourse to arms.133
So for Vattel it is clear that civil wars are regulated by law. But
where does the law come from? According to Vattel, it is “evident
that the common laws of war—those maxims of humanity, modera-
tion, and honour, which we have already detailed in the course of
this work—ought to be observed by both parties in every civil
war.”134 So the common laws of war are simply the laws of war
derived from natural law applicable in noninternational conflicts.
Vattel’s work is replete with other references to the “common law
of war.” He writes that the “obligation to observe the common law
of war towards each other is therefore absolute” and is “indispens-
ably binding” on all parties.135 He uses the phrase “common law of
war” as a broad category that applies in war regardless of the formal
status of the parties.136 Thus, the law of war stemming from the law
of nations is a particular subset of the common law of war, which
applies regardless of whether the conflict is international or
internal. For example, Vattel states that “no nation, under pretence
of having justice on her side, ever complains of the hostilities of her
enemy, while he confines them within the limits prescribed by the
common laws of war.”137 Vattel and the other natural law theorists
were working under a paradigm that today would be referred to as
IAC/NIAC convergence.
The phrase “common law of war” was not simply a creature of
Vattel’s work. Other natural law theorists influenced by Vattel used
the same terminology to similar effect. In his Elements of Interna-
tional Law, Wheaton refers to the general idea behind the common
law of war when he concludes that “the general usages of nations
regards [civil wars] as entitling both the contending parties to all
the rights of war as against each other, and even as respects neutral
nations.”138 Westlake had similar views and concluded that insur-
133. VATTEL, supra note 13, § 293, at 425.
134. Id. § 294, at 425.
135. Id. § 295, at 427.
136. See, e.g., id.
137. Id. § 191, at 382-83.
138. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 365 (William Beach
Lawrence ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 6th ed. 1855).
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gents have belligerent rights and that “the government against
which it is directed may and ought, for the sake of humanity, to
treat it as war while the struggle continues.”139 But somewhere
along the way, the language of the common law of war was
dispensed—probably at the same time that natural law departed
from the scene of legal analysis.
The genealogy of the “common law of war” unearthed in this
Article helps illuminate the basic structure of the law of war. The
phrase “common law of war” reinforces the eternal truth that the
laws of war were originally designed to be reciprocal above all else.
The whole point of the law of war is that it should be universally
applied to all sides of a conflict, even a noninternational conflict that
rises to the level of a full civil war. Indeed, the core feature of
natural law is that it binds everyone because the original normative
pull emerges not from positive sources but from something far
deeper—the dictates of natural reason. In this respect, all sides of
a military conflict were bound to follow certain precepts regarding
their behavior that stemmed from maxims of “humanity, modera-
tion, and honour,” in Vattel’s famous phrase.140 In an era of war
involving non-state actors such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, which are
neither signatories of treaties nor formal participants in an
international order that generates customary law through state
action and opinio juris, it is important to remember that the laws of
war were originally binding on all parties because their normative
content stemmed from maxims of humanity. 
Of course, we no longer live in an era of natural law. Under pre-
vailing attitudes and methodologies, the sources of international law
are limited to general principles, treaties, and custom. The applica-
tion of the laws of war to actors that stand outside of that formal
system—including rebel groups and non-state actors which have no
formal status in the Westphalian international order—is completely
confusing. As it stands now, non-state groups often—though not
always—ignore the constraints embodied by the law of war.141
Under natural law, though, this asymmetry was flattened out by the
fact that the common law of war applied equally to sovereign
139. 2 JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1907).
140. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
141. See generally JAMES MURROW, ORDER WITHIN ANARCHY (2014).
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governments and rebel forces engaged in fighting without the formal
backing of a recognized government.142 Of course, this is not to
suggest that non-state actors such as al-Qaeda are legally or
morally equivalent to the type of rebel forces discussed by Vattel or
other natural law theorists. There are crucial differences. Rebel
forces make claims to political legitimacy with regard to the proper
control of the central government; they are, in other words, compet-
itors for the seat of government. In contrast, terrorist organizations
are often destabilizing forces seeking to exact revenge on a popula-
tion or coerce a particular outcome that has nothing to do with
gaining control of a government or territory. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that the original
source for the normativity of the laws of war was the broadest possi-
ble foundation: the maxims of humanity, moderation, and honor.143
These transcendental principles were applied to all parties to an
armed conflict—they were “common” to all, even if one of the parties
was not a signatory to a treaty or a participant in the project of
creating customary norms. The common laws of war were universal
principles that were applied universally, even when the conflict was
noninternational in nature and the regular machinery of interna-
tional customs did not formally apply. This is the lost meaning of
the phrase that contemporary usage of the term has obfuscated. 
VI. THE DUAL MEANING OF COMMON LAW
A pertinent example of the transformation of the phrase “common
law of war” is the use of the phrase in Winthrop’s key treatise on
military law.144 That treatise includes several references to the
common law of war, in each case making clear that the principle
applied in the U.S. Civil War; even in Winthrop’s treatise, though,
the texture and context of the phrase started to evaporate.145 It is
clear that the phrase was still in use by military lawyers in Win-
142. Again, the fact that natural law applied in this way is not to suggest that it was al-
ways followed by rebels, who for many reasons had incentives to ignore the dictates of natural
reason.
143. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
144. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 795 (2d ed. 1920).
145. See id. at 795, 809.
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throp’s era, in part because of its inclusion in the Lieber Code.146
However, if Winthrop’s treatise is read without first understanding
Lieber’s primary use of “common law of war,” the phrase starts to
generate more confusion than illumination.
For example, Professor John Dehn suggests—by virtue of a close
reading of Winthrop’s treatise—that a common law of war theory
might provide a jurisdictional foundation for prosecuting a domestic
war offense before a military tribunal.147 Dehn concedes that both
Winthrop and Lieber viewed the law of war as a branch of the law
of nations, though Dehn argues that this was consistent with pun-
ishment of municipal offenses.148 Specifically, Dehn argues that
Winthrop’s recognition of municipal offenses represented the com-
mon law development of the law of nations within England—a
methodology supported by Winthrop’s reputation as the “Blackstone
of Military Law.”149 From this evidence, Dehn catalogues the various
offenses that Winthrop identified as violations of the law of war, a
result that occurred because “precedent modified the applicable
rule” through the “English common law system.”150 This reading is
mistaken because it emphasizes the wrong aspect of common law in
the concept of the “common law of war.” To be fair, this mistake is
not Dehn’s but rather Winthrop’s, who took Lieber’s concept of the
“common law of war” and gave it a Blackstonian gloss that funda-
mentally altered the concept as Lieber understood it.151
Part of the problem with the task of interpreting the phrase
“common law of war” is that the underlying phrase “common law”
is inherently ambiguous, even downright mercurial. It includes
several related concepts that are intertwined. First, the phrase
“common law” refers to a law that is common across different
146. See Lieber Code, supra note 85, art. 13.
147. See John C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence: The
Common Law Origins of ‘Murder in Violation of the Law of War,’ 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 63, 79-
81 (2009). Dehn’s argument regarding the “common law of war” is one part of his multi-
layered defense of “murder in violation of the law of war” as a crime that can be prosecuted
as a municipal offense before a military commission. See id. at 66. The argument does not
address its applicability to the crime of conspiracy. However, the predicate analysis—the
existence of a body of municipal law prosecutable before a military commission applying the
common law of war—is the same in the conspiracy context.
148. Id. at 75.
149. Id. at 76 (quoting Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006)).
150. Id. at 77.
151. See WINTHROP, supra note 144, at 773.
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regions, areas, or jurisdictions. As will be described in detail below,
the phrase “common law” originally referred to the law that was
common to the King’s realm, as opposed to local law.152 In today’s
parlance, this commonality of the common law refers to the United
States’ participation in a shared legal culture that includes other
Commonwealth countries, such as Britain, Australia, and Canada,
and, in general, all legal jurisdictions that trace their origins back
to Anglo-Saxon England. This points to the second element of the
phrase “common law,” which refers to its historicity. When lawyers
talk of the common law, they often refer to the law of England at a
particular period of time, as in, for example: “At common law, the
courts of law and equity were sharply divided with different
procedures, writs, and legal norms.” This is an inherently backward-
looking use of the phrase.
Third, the phrase “common law” often refers to “judge-made law,”
in the sense that lawyers discuss a “common law precedent” or even
study “common law decisionmaking.”153 In both instances, the use
of the phrase “common law” is designed to highlight the degree to
which the legal norm is not embodied in a particular statute. So, for
example, certain rules of contract or tort law might be described as
common law rules in the sense that judges, in the course of deciding
particular cases, articulated and expanded the common law of
contract or torts in the absence of statutory regulation.154 And,
famously, the Erie decision required that federal courts respect that
state jurisdictions can each develop their common law in different
and unique ways, so that the common law of contracts in Pennsylva-
nia at one point in time might diverge from the common law of con-
tracts in New York State.155 This aspect of “common law,” especially
post-Erie, stands in some tension with the first use of the phrase
152. See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 10 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Courts often
use the phrase “common law” in this way. See, e.g., Woodman ex rel. Woodman v. Kera LLC,
785 N.W.2d 1, 21 (Mich. 2010). For a discussion of this terminology, see Stephen J. Ware,
Originalism, Balanced Legal Realism and Judicial Selection: A Case Study, 22 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 165, 170 (2013).
154. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1996).
155. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general
common law.”).
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“common law” as described above, which referred to the law as being
common to the whole realm.156 One use of the phrase highlights the
commonality of the law, while the other use highlights the exact
opposite, that is, the variability of the law between jurisdictions
(because, as Holmes said, the common law is not some “brooding
omnipresence in the sky”).157 This shift in viewing the common law
as individualized and a fragmentary, centrifugal impulse instead of
a centripetal and unifying force cannot be divorced from the growing
influence of legal realism that played such an important role in
Holmes’s thinking, and, ultimately, the Erie decision.158
The earliest uses of the phrase “common law,” or jus commune,
came from canon law. In his history of the laws of England, Hudson
dates the concept at least as far back as the Dialogue of the Exche-
quer, a twelfth-century legal text.159 As the phrase developed, it
came to refer to the law that was common across the entire realm,
as opposed to local practices and legal customs that differed from
place to place.160 In other words, the point of common law was that
there remained fragmentation and pluralism across various locali-
ties.161 However, there also remained some principles that were
truly common and universal, meaning that there were some legal
rights or entitlements that did not depend on the particular location
where they were asserted.162 Those universal principles constituted
the common law. The phrase referred to a shared legal culture that
was consistent across the realm.163
It is precisely this aspect of the phrase “common law” that is
picked up by the use of the phrase “common law of war” in both
Vattel’s philosophy and the Lieber Code. The reason the common
156. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
157. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The com-
mon law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign
or quasi-sovereign that can be identified.”).
158. But see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism,
84 VA. L. REV. 673, 710 (1998) (concluding that scholars are wrong to assume that legal
realism determined Erie’s outcome because “Erie’s holding and what it replaced are consistent
with legal realism”).
159. 2 JOHN HUDSON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 853 (2012).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 854-55 (indicating that there were “considerable limits to the consistency of law
across the realm”).
162. See id. at 853.
163. Id.
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law of war applied in all wars, whether international or civil, was
that all parties were participants in a shared legal culture—some-
thing greater that bound them together. For Vattel, the “common
law of war” was not an expression of local exceptionalism; it was,
rather, the expression of a common legal culture that applied to
everyone equally. Because the international system was built upon
natural law, the law was common to the entire “realm,” the realm
of humanity.
The same notion of commonality undergirds Lieber’s use of the
term when he refers to the “common law of war.” Indeed, Lieber
wrote extensively in his other texts about the shared political and
legal culture that binds together both parties and enemies in an
armed conflict. For example, in his lectures on the law and usages
of war, Lieber notes that all nations are part of the same fam-
ily—the family of “civilization.”164 Of course, not all natural law
theorists were inclined to view the concept of “civilization” broadly.
Indeed, some scholars of the natural law era viewed civilization as
a religious concept and concluded that the same principles did not
generally apply in wars of religion with those outside of the
religion.165 However, the fact that the concept of civilization was
once understood in discriminatory fashion (with racial or religious
overtones), as opposed to today’s more appropriate universal under-
standing of the term, does not change the overall interpretation of
the concept as a fundamentally transnational regulator. The “com-
mon law of war” applied to “humanity” or “civilization” as those
latter terms were understood (or misunderstood) in that era. In that
sense, the natural inheritor of the common law of war is the
“customs and usages of civilized nations,” a recognized forerunner
of today’s more typical reference to customary international law.166
Even when nations go to war against each other and seek to
defeat each other on the battlefield, they nonetheless retain their
common membership in that greater family of civilization.167 This
164. Lieber, supra note 109.
165. See, e.g., 1 HENRY WAGER HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR RULES REGULATING THE
INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR ch. XIV, § 7, at 457 (Sherston Baker ed., London,
C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1878) (1861).
166. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
167. Lieber notes that the only entities that are not part of the family of civilization are
savages; by extension, Lieber concludes that wars of plunder, or genocide, belong to the
savage state of man. See Lieber, supra note 109.
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point is no small example of Lieberian political theory; in fact, it
provides the normative source for the restrictions and constraints
that gain their expression in the laws of war. Lieber believed that
the laws of war were binding on all parties to an armed conflict
precisely because all parties were members of the same family of
civilization. Although local variations might apply depending on
location and context, the common core of the law of nations, and by
extension the customs of war, remained the same (as long as the
participants were all members of a common humanity) because it all
flowed from natural law.168 Consequently, Lieber’s use of the phrase
“common law of war” needs to be read within that context. The
common law of war was common precisely because the law of war,
via the shared element of civilization, was binding on all parties.
The use of the phrase “common law of war” directly appealed to the
unifying aspect of the common law, not to its more recent usage that
emphasizes local divergence and uniqueness and the freedom of
judges to decide the law as they see fit.
It is this modern usage the government mistakenly relies upon
when it refers to the “common law of war” as the historical practice
of the United States regarding prosecutions before military tribu-
nals.169 The government’s use perverts the concept of the common
law by turning it on its head. The government deploys the phrase as
a justification for allowing the United States to formulate a purely
domestic body of law, based on precedent, which diverges sharply
from the practice of international jurisdictions. But this reading of
the concept is ahistorical. It ignores the “common law” in the
“common law of war.” Moreover, it rigidly imposes a very contempo-
rary understanding of the phrase “common law,” which is at odds
with how the term “common law” was used when the phrase
“common law of war” was first used by Vattel and Lieber, by early
U.S. courts, and by jurists at the time of the Lincoln trial.170 Far
from sanctioning U.S. departure from international custom, the
phrase “common law of war” in fact does the exact opposite: it
reinforces and deepens U.S. compliance with, and participation in,
a shared legal culture that is “common” to all. As the following Part
168. See, e.g., 1 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE ch. I, at 17-30 (A.C.
Campbell ed. & trans., 1901) (1625).
169. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170. See supra Part IV.
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will demonstrate, the substantive charge of conspiracy is not con-
sistent with the “common law of war” once that phrase’s meaning is
properly understood.
VII. CONSPIRACY UNDER THE COMMON LAW OF WAR
Having unearthed a coherent account of the common law of war,
the time has now come to apply this interpretation of the term to
the government’s position in Al Bahlul and ask whether the term
performs the conceptual work to which the government has assigned
it. The government’s position is that Bahlul can be prosecuted for
conspiracy pursuant to the common law of war because military
commissions in the past have prosecuted defendants for conspir-
acy.171 Under this interpretation, the common law of war is a set of
purely domestic precedents—prosecution under this common law of
war is analogous to the prosecution of “common law crimes” in state
courts before criminal law was widely codified in this country.172
Commentators have rightly pointed out that interpreting the
common law of war in this unilateral fashion would be greatly
damaging to the interests of the United States and contrary to the
whole purpose of the laws of war.173 First, it generates a potential
multiplicity of domestic “common laws of war” that are different in
each country, which is a bit like saying that there is one version of
international law in the United States and another version of
international law in Russia or China.174 That cannot be the case.
171. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
172. See Keith S. Alexander, Note, In the Wake of September 11th: The Use of Military
Tribunals to Try Terrorists, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 885, 894 (2003) (“Much like prosecutions
under traditional English common law crimes, the federal government is prosecuting war
criminals in military tribunals using the common law of war.”).
173. See Recent Case, Ex Post Facto Clause—Guantánamo Prosecutions—D.C. Circuit
Reinterprets Military Commissions Act of 2006 to Allow Retroactive Prosecution of Conspiracy
to Commit War Crimes.—Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), 128 HARV.
L. REV. 2040, 2047 (2015) (“Additionally, Congress would have recognized that allowing prose-
cutions under a U.S. common law of war would put American service-members at risk of
prosecution under an indeterminate foreign ‘common law of war.’ The ‘unilateralist impulse’
that undergirds the government’s theory of a U.S. common law of war is yet ‘another
manifestation of the United States’s view that international law should not constrain its
ability to wage a global armed conflict against al Qaeda.’” (footnotes omitted)).
174. Id. (“Therefore, interpreting ‘law of war’ in § 821 to encompass a U.S. common law of
war would defy seventy years of Supreme Court precedent and Congressional intent to further
the stability and universality of the international law of war.”).
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International law is international law—everywhere. To put the
point more sharply, suggesting that the laws of war can be domesti-
cated is like saying that the laws of physics could be different in
each country, which is nonsensical. Second, even if this unilateral
interpretation were conceptually coherent, it would also be danger-
ous to the United States.175 The whole point of the laws of war is
that their reciprocal and universal nature provides stability and
predictability to the conflict.176 If the United States reserves the
right to apply its own domestic common law of war in the Al Bahlul
case, it raises the specter of other countries applying their own do-
mestic common law of war against U.S. nationals during a foreign
prosecution. This is hardly a satisfactory result for the national
interests of the United States.
The historical evidence regarding the phrase “common law of war”
deepens this analysis. Only in recent time has the phrase referred
to a domestic body of law which is unilateral in nature.177 The evi-
dence outlined in the previous parts reveals that the common laws
of war were never a unilateral body of law.178 In fact, they were
precisely the opposite: they were a universal body of law that was
common to all parties to the armed conflict.179 Indeed, they were
arguably more universal than even the international laws of war
today, because they stemmed from natural law.180 In fact, the phrase
had the opposite meaning of that currently used by lawyers for the
United States government.181
Consequently, the government’s argument regarding Bahlul’s con-
spiracy conviction must fail. The substantive crime of conspiracy is
not common at all—something that the government already conced-
ed when it noted that conspiracy is not a violation of international
175. Id. (“This approach would pose serious risks for Americans.... American military
prosecutors, judges, and other legal actors could face foreign prosecution ‘for the war crime
of denial of a fair trial’—an offense recognized under Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and in the Rome Statute—for prosecuting crimes by military commission that
are not recognized as war crimes.”). 
176. Id. (“[F]oreign adversaries could assert their own common law of war to try captured
American personnel, with tremendous indeterminacy ex ante about what acts are prohib-
ited.”).
177. See supra Part II.
178. See supra Parts IV-V.
179. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part IV.
181. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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law.182 The analysis of conspiracy under the common law of war is
substantially similar to the analysis of conspiracy under interna-
tional law, and the result in both cases is the same.
Despite widespread usage of conspiracy language by American
lawyers in the run-up to Nuremberg, conspiracy was famously
rejected as a substantive offense at Nuremberg itself.183 The result
was a compromise of sorts: Conspiracy was retained for crimes
against peace (what later became aggression), but rejected for all
other crimes, including crimes against humanity and war crimes.184
Subsequently, conspiracy to commit genocide was included, presum-
ably as an inchoate offense, in the post-World War II Genocide
Convention.185 The Genocide Convention provision on conspiracy
was carried over verbatim into the statutes of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were
passed by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 and 1994,
respectively.186 However, the drafters of the Rome Statute for the
creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) rejected conspir-
acy even for genocide and declined to follow the precedents estab-
lished by the Geneva Convention and the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes.187 The change of heart is significant. At least part of the
shift might be explained by the different negotiation procedures be-
hind these international courts. The ICTY and ICTR were negoti-
ated by the major powers and attached as appendices to Security
Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter.188 In contrast, the Rome Statute was negotiated by a true
international conference, the future state parties to the permanent
182. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
183. See Patricia M. Wald, Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1559, 1592 (2006). 
184. Id. (“In the end no defendant was convicted of conspiracy alone and the conspiracy
count was not only restricted to conspiracy to wage aggressive war—and not conspiracy to
commit any of the other indictable war crimes or crimes against humanity—but defined on
the basis of not one giant but several smaller, more discrete conspiracies.”).
185. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
606 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (2012)).
186. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
187. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 6, 2187 U.N.T.S
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
188. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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court.189 In that wider forum, conspiracy as a substantive offense
had even less support—even for the crime of conspiracy to commit
genocide.
Digesting all of this information, the most that can be said of
conspiracy as a substantive offense is that it remains an interna-
tionally viable doctrine in isolated pockets of jurisprudence for core
crimes that are considered especially dangerous for the interna-
tional community in two very discrete circumstances: genocide and
aggression. However, even that conclusion is somewhat overstated,
given the Rome Statute’s categorical rejection of conspiracy and the
lack of any modern precedent for conspiracy to commit aggression.190
George Fletcher was certainly right when he declared that conspir-
acy to commit genocide was “the afterglow of a dying concept.”191
The most that can be said is that conspiracy to commit genocide was
a viable inchoate offense at the ICTR, where genocide is regarded as
a particularly virulent danger that requires extra penal tools—in-
cluding inchoate offenses—affording authorities the opportunity to
intervene in burgeoning criminal endeavors.192 This rationale helps
explain both conspiracy to commit genocide as well as direct and
public incitement to commit genocide.193 
The United States continues to use conspiracy as an inchoate
offense to prosecute terrorists.194 Also, the federal government often
uses conspiracy in tandem with other inchoate offenses, such as
attempt and material support for terrorism, with the result being
double inchoate offenses such as attempt or conspiracy to provide
material support for terrorism.195 Although conspiracy is certainly
used in some other jurisdictions as well, in terrorism and other do-
mestic law offenses it does not form part of the universal grammar
189. See Rome Statute, supra note 187, art. 1.
190. See id. art. 6.
191. Amicus Curiae Brief for Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law Petitioner
at 12, Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 53979.
192. See ICTR Statute, supra note 186.
193. The ICTR concluded, arguably in dicta, that incitement to commit genocide could be
prosecuted in an inchoate context. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgement, ¶ 561 (Sept. 2, 1998).
194. For a discussion of some of these prosecutions, see WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR
107-09 (2015).
195. For examples, see United States v. Ahmed, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1005 (D. Minn.
2015); United States v. Ahmed, 94 F. Supp. 3d 394, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), reh’g denied, No. 12-
CR-661 (SLT) (S-2), 2015 WL 1636827 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015).
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of criminal law. Plenty of domestic jurisdictions exclude conspiracy
from their domestic penal law, preferring instead to rely on other
concepts and doctrines. The hesitation felt by civil law jurists at
Nuremberg certainly lingers to this day.
CONCLUSION
Whether conspiracy forms a part of the common law of war
depends entirely on what, exactly, the “common law of war” means.
If the common law of war is a pure creature of domestic law, there
might be some rationale for lending credence to the government’s
legal theory as advocated in Al Bahlul. However, if the common law
of war is a body of law that is truly “common”—as outlined in this
Article—then conspiracy has no place in it. Indeed, even Justice
Thomas, who voted in favor of the commissions’ jurisdiction over the
crime of conspiracy, should support this conclusion since he has
already stated that the common law of war derives from the
common usages of civilized nations.196 Conspiracy is an expression
of U.S. legal exceptionalism, which may have its place in Article III
courts. But military commissions apply the law of war, which can
either be described as the international law of war or the common
law of war; either way, conspiracy is not a part of it.
196. Justice Thomas’s definition of the common law of war includes its derivation from “the
laws and usages of war as understood and practiced by the civilized nations of the world,” a
citation that implicitly recognizes the natural law origins of the term. Hamdan I, 548 U.S.
557, 689 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Military Comm’ns, 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 297,
310 (1865)).
